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Abstract 
 
The major claim of this article is twofold, that is, that fixed assets in small manufacturing 
enterprises in developing countries have to be seen with respect to two roles. The first is 
capital intensity. The second is the collateral value of these assets. The former is associated 
with the small manufacturing firms’ hazard of exit in a U-shaped fashion. The latter takes up a 
wave-shaped relationship. Failure in the extant empirical literature to fit a binomial 
specification for capital intensity results in either a negative or a positive relationship, or even, 
lack of statistical significance. All these three outcomes are the results of a misguided attempt 
to fit an “artificial” monotonic specification to an actual U-shaped relationship. The trinomial 
specification for the collateral value of the small manufacturing enterprises’ fixed assets has 
never been attempted. Thus, the present article proposes a new framework for the study of the 
impact of the small manufacturing enterprises’ fixed assets investment strategy upon their 
hazard of exit. 
 
Keywords: Small firms; Business survival determinants; Capital intensity; collateral 
value of fixed assets; Cox regression 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
This article is a continuation of the revision of empirical research on the determinants of 
mortality in small and medium-sized enterprises, whose proposition was first set out in Barbosa 
(2016b). Before proceeding, a word has to be said in order to increase its chances of success. From 
the present work, empirical evidence provided by previous studies will become increasingly 
scarce. The reason for this is that the theme of capital intensity and the ones that will be tackled in 
the following working papers have been less explored by authors. As a result, achieving the goals 
set out by inspiration upon Low and MacMillan (1988)’s thinking will depend very much on 
action by the scholars whose works are being revised. This action is checking and reporting 
whether the arguments made in the present article are correct. This is very much necessary, if the 
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Low and MacMillan (1988)’s main preoccupation, namely, to derive the maximum benefit from 
future research, deserves due consideration. 
 
Doms and Others (1995) recognize the heterogeneity in capital usage in terms of two 
distinct concepts, both being expected to be related to survivability. The first concerns the use of 
advanced manufacturing technologies. According to these authors, the use of advanced 
manufacturing technologies may directly increase plant productivity and thus survivability. Still 
according to them, the use of advanced technologies may be a proxy for unobserved managerial 
ability. If plants with superior management are best able to fully exploit advanced production 
technologies, then plants with high-quality managers will be the most likely to adopt the new 
production methods as well as be the most likely to survive because of their efficiency advantages. 
The second concerns capital intensity. According to Doms and Others (1995), a basic rationale for 
the link of this variable with survivability is that plants with higher capital-labor ratios may have a 
lower ratio of variable to fixed costs. Given the basic shutdown rule that a plant will remain in 
operation as long as it can cover variable costs, plants with low variable-cost production 
techniques may be more likely to withstand negative shocks than high variable-cost producers. 
Another reason is that in the presence of sunk entry or exit costs and uncertain future market 
conditions, there is an option value to remaining in a market even if the producer is incurring 
losses. 
 
Grossi and Gozzi (2005) suggest that the average industry capital intensity is a measure of 
the extent of scale economies in it and that, therefore, firms increasing their capital intensity are 
expected to have a higher chance of survival given the scale of their respective industry. López-
Garcia and Puente (2006), following a viewpoint adopted by Doms and Others (1995), affirm that 
the share variable costs represent in relation to total cost is inversely determined by capital 
intensity and, consequently, if there is a negative shock by which prices go down, for example, 
less capital-intensive firms will exit the market first. According to Shiferaw (2009), more capital 
per person could enhance labor productivity and reduce the hazard of failure. Still according the 
same author, this is a view espoused by theories of industrial evolution that relate firm survival to 
investment in productivity-enhancing activities (Pakes and Ericson, 1998). 
 
For certain, Doms and Others (1995) and other quoted authors are not specifically 
concerned with small and medium manufacturing enterprises in developing countries. Also, their 
words imply a one-direction direct relationship or no relationship between use of capital and 
survivability. For his part, Barbosa (2012) is concerned with the technological modernization of 
the small and medium manufacturing firms in Brazil. Specifically, this author is concerned with 
the emphasis put on this by the Brazilian small business development support that might cause so 
radical a change in the nature of the assisted small manufacturing enterprises that they would end 
up suffering from the shortcomings of bigness without getting rid of those of smallness. Barbosa 
(2012) pinpoints many flaws in the emphasis on technological modernization. One flaw is that the 
small manufacturing firms in developing countries are not able to expand their sales through new 
channels to an extent that would warrant the extensive and expensive use of modern equipment. 
Another one is that these firms are not able to obtain a regular supply of raw materials in the 
quantities needed to run efficiently modern machinery. Modern machinery would imply the use of 
expensive, processed industrial inputs, made of imported products or imported altogether, which 
would make the then modern small firms face the problems entailed by the big businesses' control 
over raw materials markets. A third flaw would stem from shortage of skilled labor and the low 
level of educational attainment by the developing countries’ active population that would drive the 
small manufacturing firms into facing difficulties in competing with big businesses over recruiting 
workers capable of efficiently operating modern machines. Another flaw is that the small business 
manpower problem may become worse after technological modernization, given the unfair 
situation in which small firms hire workers and train them on the job only to play the role of cheap 
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training centers for their larger counterparts, which, by offering higher salaries, take away the best 
professionals. A last, but not exhaustive, flaw is that the small firm would not be protected 
anymore by the shield of limited, fragmented, segmented markets in regions lacking adequate 
infrastructure in case of being technologically modernized, since it would have to forego its 
original market by moving to a large industrial centre, because modern technology calls for 
adequate provision of technical support services to guarantee efficient operation. Moreover, 
standardized products would imply that custom design would be less a source of profit for the 
small company. 
 
 Regardless of the theoretical weight of the theories of industrial evolution, which back 
up the first approach above, and the fact that its field of application is that of large companies or 
the warmth of the “theories of domination”, which permeates the second approach, and the fact 
that its field of studies is that of small businesses, all the three possible results of empirical 
investigations that seek to identify a relationship between capital intensity and business survival 
have come out from the analyses so far carried out. Besides, a direct, an inverse and no 
relationship are found irrespective of stage of development of the studied country. These 
conflicting results are invariably attributed to an array of causes, being different countries, 
different size bands, different methodologies, different samples and different numbers and nature 
of explored covariates some of the most cited ones. For its part, this article claims that, as long as 
small manufacturing enterprises are concerned, different studies find different results because of a 
misguided attempt to fit a linear specification when, in fact, the actual relationship between capital 
intensity and the hazard of exit is a U-shaped one. Thus, in developing countries the above 
approach by studies that defend the existence of a special context of the small firm development 
potential stands a step ahead. That is, some technological modernization brings benefits for these 
manufacturing concerns, but too much modernization reverses the effect. 
 
Because of the foregoing, interest in this study is restricted to small firms, not only because 
these enterprises have been receiving particular attention by virtue of their differential nature and 
social and economic importance, but also because large enterprises’ survival probabilities do not 
seem to depend so much on variations on capital intensity. There are some works that confirm 
this. Ferragina and Mazzotta (2015) reported a Table of Cox regressions in which capital intensity 
had no impact on the hazard rate in the class of multinationals, normally very large enterprises. 
Kimura and Fujii (2003) found mixed results for capital intensity according to size classes. Their 
capital/labor ratio was statistically significant in a negative association with the hazard of exit in 
the size classes 50-99, 300-499 and 500-599 employees but not in the classes 100-199, 200-299 
and 1000 or more employees. 
 
By using data and insights from a study that investigated the common determinants of the 
firm’s capital structure and of business survival, it is possible to investigate in-depth the 
relationships between, on the one side, the small manufacturing enterprises’ hazard of exit and, on 
the other side, capital intensity and the collateral value of fixed assets. This particular research 
work is uniquely suitable to such an end in view of the facts that it has dealt with a complete array 
of variables measured at the firm’s operations level, besides including in the analyzes both 
industry and economy level covariates, made use of many non-linear specifications, and achieved 
a very high degree of explanation of the total variation in survival probability.  
 
However, for many reasons, this reference study does not claim to have the robustness 
necessary to back strongly its main theses. A major reason concerns its small sample size. To 
overcome this weakness, the extant literature is used whatever the way it is possible to bring about 
evidence in support of these theses. As empirical studies on the impact of capital intensity upon 
the small firms’ survival prospects have been accumulating for a long time now, a non-negligible 
amount of insights, contradictions and flaws are available for reviewing. This is the second major 
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source from where support for the main theses of this study is eagerly sought. With the insights 
made possible by the analysis in the reference study, the unexpected, “contradictory” and 
“awkward” results reported in the literature on capital intensity and business survival can be 
clarified, the better the more relevant additional information is provided by the research reports. It 
is understood that the better the reference study clarify these “strange” results the stronger the 
empirical support lent by the corresponding works to the reference study theses.  
 
The achievements of the present study are surprisingly numberless and diversified. First 
statistical significance is generally very high. Capital intensity, in varying ways of measuring it, 
and the collateral value of fixed assets are confirmed as major determinants of the small 
manufacturing enterprises’ hazard of exit. The findings allows the postulation of a new framework 
that best represents the relationship between capital intensity and small business survival, which is 
proposed for investigating, analyzing and interpreting such a relationship, being capital intensity 
either central to the study or included only as a control. Also, many predictions from the findings 
or from interpretations of the findings are also generated. Finally, this framework and its 
predictions are used to confront results in the extant literature in search for extra support for the 
findings and theses of the present study. This effort is successful in view of the fact that the 
greatest portion of the literature adjusted to the new proposed framework. 
 
The remainder of the working paper unfolds as follows. In Section 2, a quick word is 
dedicated to the original reference study. Section 3 reports detailed results for capital intensity and 
the collateral value of fixed assets. Section 4 presents an in-depth review of the related literature in 
search for additional evidence that supports the findings of the analysis on the impact of capital 
intensity and the collateral value of fixed assets on the small manufacturing enterprises’ hazard of 
exit. Section 5 concludes by summarizing the overall results of the research effort and by 
addressing main implications for theory, policy making and small business support, and for the 
management of the very small manufacturing enterprises. Of course, the traditional issues of 
limitations of the present and suggestions for future enquiries are addressed also in this last 
section. 
 
 
 
2. THE REFERENCE STUDY 
 
The reference study is described in far more details, comparisons, explanations and 
justifications in Barbosa (2009). However, interested readers may find that, for the purposes of 
this article, the version presented in Barbosa (2016a), which abbreviates the conventional analyses 
on the determinants of small business survival, may be sufficient as a reference. Barbosa 
(2016b)’s working paper on the relationships between, on the one hand, size, growth and age of 
the firm and, on the other hand, small business survival may be of some help, but it is not essential 
for the understanding of any part of this study. 
 
It only suffices here to define the variables that are introduced in the present analyses. 
These are measures concerning the fixed assets of the studied small manufacturing enterprises. 
Then, first, there is the measure of the collateral value of the fixed assets of these companies. It is 
simply the reverse of the already presented machinery/fixed assets ratio, that is, 1 minus the 
machinery/fixed assets ratio. The selection of this measure is inspired by the statement by Binks 
(1979) that for a small firm a higher proportion of fixed assets does not mean higher capacity to 
collateralize debt, since very small firms are urged to start acquiring plant and equipment well 
before they are able to begin buying property, and plant and equipment are often considered 
unacceptable as viable security. Thus, this variable has different meanings, depending where in the 
scale a specific small firm is located. Being on the beginning of the scale up to some extension of 
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it means that most of the firm’s investment in fixed assets is made in plant and equipment, what 
can mean that the enterprise is highly capital intensive. Towards the end of the scale, it means that 
all investment in fixed assets is in land and buildings. Last, being in the middle of the scale means 
that the small enterprise has a lot of money invested in vehicles and apparels for keeping stock or 
for the transportation of finished goods. 
 
Two measures worked with in the reference study (Barbosa, 2009) but that were not 
presented in Barbosa (2016a) are the capital/labor ratio, the most traditional measure of capital 
intensity, and the plant & equipment ratio. The former is defined as plant & equipment/number of 
employees, averaged over the years available to each enterprise. The latter is defined as plant & 
equipment/total assets, also averaged over the years available to each enterprise. Theoretically, the 
plant & equipment ratio could not perform well as a measure of capital intensity, since it varies 
depending not only on the long-term investment decisions of the firm but also on its choices from 
alternative strategic short-term investment decisions. This is so much so because the plant & 
equipment ratio is a proportion of the firm’s total assets. 
 
Labor productivity, total factor productivity and type of firm also have to be defined 
because they are used in the revisions of previous works to be carried out in Section 4. Labor 
productivity corresponds to the division of annual sales turnover by the number of employees, 
averaged over the years available to each enterprise. The non-standardized residuals from an OLS 
multiple regression of logarithm of sales on the logarithm of total assets and logarithm of number 
of employees are taken as the values of the total factor productivity variable. Type of firm takes 
three values, namely, 1 for sole proprietorship, 2 for family business and 3 for partnership. 
 
 
 
3. RESULTS WITH THE CAPITAL INTENSITY AND COLLATERAL VALUE OF ASSETS 
MEASURES AND POSTULATION OF A FRAMEWORK REFERENCE FOR 
INVESTIGATING, ANALYZING AND INTERPRETING THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN 
THESE COVARIATES AND SMALL BUSINESS SURVIVAL 
 
 
 In Table I, auxiliary equations (2) to (4) report results for the fitting of the most 
conventional measure of capital intensity, namely, the capital/labor ratio. Main equation (1) has 
been brought over from the reference study (Barbosa 2009; Barbosa 2016a) for comparison 
purposes only. In it, the machinery/fixed assets ratio has been replaced by the measure of 
collateral value of fixed assets. Auxiliary equation (2) shows results for the monotonic 
specification employed by all researchers in the whole of the empirical literature that either 
investigates the impact of the capital/labor ratio on the small enterprises’ survival prospects or 
controls for its effects. The sign of the estimated coefficient is negative, as expected, but is 
statistically insignificant. The fitting of the quadratic specification, which is the choice of all 
researchers when allowing for non-linear effects of other investigated determinants, such the size 
of the firm, produces a result strikingly different, that is, highly statistically significant parameter 
estimates of the adjustment of the specification to a U-shaped relationship between the 
capital/labor ratio and the small firms’ failure likelihood. This is shown in auxiliary equations (3). 
Auxiliary equation (4) shows that results for the capital/labor ratio are greatly improved by taking 
out of the equation the medium- and long-term financial leverage and the market concentration 
covariates. 
 
 The variables capital/labor ratio, medium- and long-term financial leverage and market 
concentration compete with each other to explain variations in the hazard of exit because they are 
interrelated. Comparing the z-statistics from auxiliary equation (3) with those from the main 
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equation (1) it is clearly visible that these variables have their coefficients and statistical 
significance drastically reduced, whereas most of the other covariates experiment the opposite 
effects. Auxiliary equation (4) shows that the coefficient and statistical significance for the 
capital/labor ratio rises considerably when medium- and long-term financial leverage and market 
concentration are dropped out of the specification. 
 
Table I: Determinants of Small Business Survival/Different Specifications for the Capital/labor Ratio 
Regressors/Independent 
Variables 
COX PROPORTIONAL HAZARD MODEL 
Main Equation Auxiliary Equations 
(1) (2)+ (3)+ (4)+ 
Capital/labor ratio n.a. n.a. -0.50e-4 (1.36) -0.59e-3 (3.37)*** -0.65e-3 (4.11)*** 
Capital/labor ratio2 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.16e-7 (3.25)** 0.19e-7 (4.19)*** 
Net working capital -5.68 (4.33)*** -5.89 (4.56)*** -7.65 (5.11)*** -7.86 (5.31)*** 
Total Financial Leverage -10.72 (5.18)*** -11.60 (5.20)*** -13.31 (5.62)*** -10.71 (5.10)*** 
Medium- and Long-term Financial 
Leverage 11.58 (3.25)** 12.84 (3.30)** 11.32 (2.86)** - - 
Profitability -0.80 (4.04)*** -0.87 (4.20)*** -1.27 (4.95)*** -1.18 (5.31)*** 
Operational cycle1/3 -27.25 (4.19)*** -27.41 (3.98)*** -37.23 (4.71)*** -36.79 (4.86)*** 
Operational cycle1/2 9.52 (4.48)*** 9.61 (4.27)*** 13.13 (4.97)*** 12.84 (5.07)*** 
Automation degree -7.18 (5.36)*** -7.16 (5.21)*** -8.25 (5.32)*** -7.52 (5.14)*** 
Automation degree2 1.35 (5.56)*** 1.36 (5.42)*** 1.57 (5.55)*** 1.43 (5.47)*** 
Collateral value of fixed assets -75.16 (5.51)*** -75.36 (5.53)*** -92.50 (5.90)*** -77.34 (5.67)*** 
Collateral value of fixed assets2 150.51 (5.18)*** 150.26 (5.22)*** 194.70 (5.68)*** 163.88 (5.45)*** 
Collateral value of fixed assets3 -86.20 (4.95)*** -86.26 (4.98)*** -118.39 (5.52)*** -102.31 (5.34)*** 
Corporate diversification -0.04 (3.51)*** -0.03 (2.76)** -0.05 (3.39)*** -0.06 (3.99)*** 
Market concentration -0.12 (3.68)*** -0.12 (3.52)*** -0.09 (2.50)* - - 
Market concentration2 1.24e-3 (3.73)*** 1.22e-3 (3.61)*** 1.02e-3 (2.82)** - - 
Client concentration 0.06 (4.47)*** 0.06 (4.58)*** 0.09 (5.08)*** 0.09 (5.54)*** 
Sales concentration in big clients 0.10 (5.54)*** 0.10 (5.36)*** 0.11 (5.47)*** 0.11 (5.86)*** 
Sales unpredictability 0.33 (3.08)** 0.38 (3.29)** 0.38 (3.18)** 0.35 (3.40)*** 
Entrepreneur’s Risk Tolerance 2.06 (5.87)*** 2.13 (5.93)*** 2.38 (6.10)*** 1.99 (5.96)*** 
3-year lagged GDP growth rate  -0.34 (3.16)** -0.37 (3.18)*** -0.44 (3.31)** -0.52 (4.72)*** 
1998 year dummy 6.49 (5.21)*** 6.75 (5.02)*** 8.59 (5.31)*** 8.12 (5.49)*** 
Market concentration X 
Operational cycle -4.53e-4 (3.42)*** -4.71e-4 (3.54)*** -7.49e-4 (4.62)*** -6.13e-4 (5.11)*** 
Sales concentration in big clients 
X Machinery/fixed assets ratio -0.11 (4.24)*** -0.11 (4.22)*** -0.11 (4.28)*** -0.12 (5.08)*** 
R 2 0.84 0.85 0.87 0.84 p 
LR chi2(22/23/24/21) 113.01*** 113.26*** 124.60*** 109.42*** 
Obs: 1) First values in the main body of the table are coefficient estimates; 2) numbers in parentheses are absolute-value z-
statistics; 3) *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 5%, 1%, and 0.1% levels, respectively; 4) + Without case 43, which is 
an influential outlier; 5) Number of events/observations (firms): 46/61. 
  
Interestingly, the auxiliary equation (3) of Table I allows the fitting of two measures of 
capital intensity at the same time, both reaching statistical significance and not disturbing each 
other. The measures are the capital/labor ratio and automation degree, which most probably are 
capturing the effects of different aspects of capital intensity. Doms and Others (1995) also work 
with two related variables, namely, the capital/labor ratio and technology usage, being the latter, 
like the automation degree variable of the reference study (Barbosa 2009; Barbosa 2016a), a 
perceptual measure. Equation (2) of Doms and Others (1995)’s table 2, in which the covariates are 
fitted contemporaneously, shows that both capital intensity measures are negatively related to the 
plants’ hazard of exit and highly statistically significant. 
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 Table II presents results for the perceptual automation degree measure of capital intensity. 
This variable already made part in the reference study (Barbosa 2009; Barbosa 2016a) of its final 
model, which is the main equation (1) in Table II. Inspection from auxiliary equation (2) over to 
main equation (1) shows that controlling for automation degree amazingly increases the quality of 
results pertaining to all the other individual effects. Auxiliary equation (3) demonstrates that the fitting 
of a monotonic specification of the automation degree measure generates a coefficient estimate 
highly statistically insignificant and with the “wrong” sign.  
 
Table II: Determinants of Small Business Survival/The impact of the Automation Degree 
Regressors/Independent Variables 
COX PROPORTIONAL HAZARD MODEL 
Main Equation Auxiliary Equations 
(1) (2) (3) 
Net working capital -5.68 (4.33)*** -4.36 (3.81)*** -4.38 (3.66)*** 
Total Financial Leverage -10.72 (5.18)*** -7.43 (4.18)*** -7.79 (4.21)*** 
Medium- and Long-term Financial Leverage 11.58 (3.25)** 8.44 (3.08)** 7.78 (2.74)** 
Profitability -0.80 (4.04)*** -0.57 (3.39)*** -0.60 (3.46)*** 
Operational cycle1/3 -27.25 (4.19)*** -12.15 (2.41)* -11.48 (2.22)* 
Operational cycle1/2 9.52 (4.48)*** 4.25 (2.64)** 4.08 (2.47)* 
Automation degree -7.18 (5.36)*** - - 0.31 (0.93) 
Automation degree2 1.35 (5.56)*** - - - - 
Collateral value of fixed assets -75.16 (5.51)*** -31.52 (3.93)*** -32.37 (3.95)*** 
Collateral value of fixed assets2 150.51 (5.18)*** 58.67 (3.31)** 59.85 (3.33)*** 
Collateral value of fixed assets3 -86.20 (4.95)*** -30.85 (2.83)** -31.41 (2.83)** 
Corporate diversification -0.04 (3.51)*** -0.02 (1.92) -0.02 (1.82) 
Market concentration -0.12 (3.68)*** -0.05 (1.88) -0.06 (2.07)* 
Market concentration2 1.24e-3 (3.73)*** 7.10e-4 (2.68)** 7.75e-4 (2.83)** 
Client concentration 0.06 (4.47)*** 0.02 (2.20)* 0.02 (2.29)* 
Sales concentration in big clients 0.10 (5.54)*** 0.05 (3.67)*** 0.05 (3.72)*** 
Sales unpredictability 0.33 (3.08)** 0.02 (0.29) 0.05 (0.62) 
Entrepreneur’s Risk Tolerance 2.06 (5.87)*** 0.93 (4.23)*** 0.97 (4.29)*** 
3-year lagged GDP growth rate  -0.34 (3.16)** -0.25 (2.69)** -0.24 (2.55)* 
1998 year dummy 6.49 (5.21)*** 4.41 (4.21)*** 4.52 (4.23)*** 
Market concentration X Operational cycle -4.53e-4 (3.42)*** -2.74e-4 (2.21)* -2.70e-4 (2.14)* 
Sales concentration in big clients X Machinery/fixed 
assets ratio -0.11 (4.24)*** -0.03 (1.76) -0.03 (1.88) 
R 2 0.84 0.71 0.71 p 
LR chi2(22/20/21) 113.01*** 74.62*** 75.53*** 
Obs: 1) First values in the main body of the table are coefficient estimates; 2) numbers in parentheses are absolute-value z-
statistics; 3) *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 5%, 1%, and 0.1% levels, respectively; 4) Number of 
events/observations (firms): 46/61. 
 
 In Table III, auxiliary equations (2) and (4) report results for the fitting of the plant & 
equipment ratio. Auxiliary equation (2) shows results for the monotonic specification. The sign of 
the estimated coefficient is positive, against expectation, but statistically insignificant. Auxiliary 
equation (3) exhibits the fitting of the best U-shaped specification. In auxiliary equations (2) and 
(3), any covariate that is missing in relation to the main equation (1) will substantially diminish 
the statistical significance of the plant & equipment ratio if such missing covariate is put back into 
the auxiliary equations. Auxiliary equation (4) exhibits results for the quadratic specification of 
the plant & equipment ratio when no other covariate is specified at the same time.  
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Table III: Determinants of Small Business Survival/ Different Specifications for the Plant & Equipment Ratio 
Regressors/Independent Variables 
COX PROPORTIONAL HAZARD MODEL 
Main Equation Auxiliary Equations 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Plant & equipment ratio(na) (na) (1/2) (1) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. -15.67 (3.35)*** -4.45 (1.78) 
Plant & equipment ratio(na) (1) (1) (2) n.a. n.a. 1.56 (1.23) 16.00 (3.60)*** 6.94 (2.24)* 
Net working capital -5.68 (4.33)*** - - - - n.a. n.a. 
Total Financial Leverage -10.72 (5.18)*** - - - - n.a. n.a. 
Medium- and Long-term Financial 
Leverage 11.58 (3.25)** - - - - n.a. n.a. 
Profitability -0.80 (4.04)*** -0.22 (1.82) -0.29 (2.46)* n.a. n.a. 
Operational cycle1/3 -27.25 (4.19)*** -5.21 (1.02) -5.09 (1.08) n.a. n.a. 
Operational cycle1/2 9.52 (4.48)*** 1.96 (1.24) 2.05 (1.39) n.a. n.a. 
Automation degree -7.18 (5.36)*** 0.16 (0.75) 0.26 (1.19) n.a. n.a. 
Automation degree2 1.35 (5.56)*** - - - - n.a. n.a. 
Collateral value of fixed assets -75.16 (5.51)*** 0.02 (0.04) -0.82 (1.29) n.a. n.a. 
Collateral value of fixed assets2 150.51 (5.18)*** - - - - n.a. n.a. 
Collateral value of fixed assets3 -86.20 (4.95)*** - - - - n.a. n.a. 
Corporate diversification -0.04 (3.51)*** -0.01 (0.77) -0.01 (0.96) n.a. n.a. 
Market concentration -0.12 (3.68)*** 0.01 (0.23) 4.97e-3 (0.21) n.a. n.a. 
Market concentration2 1.24e-3 (3.73)*** 1.99e-4 (0.92) 2.50e-4 (1.16) n.a. n.a. 
Client concentration 0.06 (4.47)*** -1.29e-3 (0.22) -5.23e-4 (0.09) n.a. n.a. 
Sales concentration in big clients 0.10 (5.54)*** 0.01 (1.74) 0.01 (1.81) n.a. n.a. 
Sales unpredictability 0.33 (3.08)** 0.07 (1.03) 0.08 (1.24) n.a. n.a. 
Entrepreneur’s Risk Tolerance 2.06 (5.87)*** - - - - n.a. n.a. 
3-year lagged GDP growth rate  -0.34 (3.16)** -0.07 (0.88) -0.07 (0.88) n.a. n.a. 
1998 year dummy 6.49 (5.21)*** - - - - n.a. n.a. 
Market concentration X Operational 
cycle -4.53e-4 (3.42)*** -2.37e-4 (2.34)* -3.02e-4 (2.78)** n.a. n.a. 
Sales concentration in big clients X 
Machinery/fixed assets ratio -0.11 (4.24)*** - - - - n.a. n.a. 
R 2 0.84 0.28 0.39 0.09 p 
LR chi2(22/14/15/2) 113.01*** 20.24 30.09* 5.57 
Obs: 1) First values in the main body of the table are coefficient estimates; 2) numbers in parentheses are absolute-value z-
statistics; 3) *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 5%, 1%, and 0.1% levels, respectively; 4) Number of 
events/observations (firms): 46/61. 
 
  
Inspection from auxiliary equation (2) over to main equation (1) in Table IV shows that 
controlling for the collateral value of fixed assets amazingly increases the quality of results 
pertaining to practically all the other individual effects. Auxiliary equation (3) demonstrates that 
the fitting of a monotonic specification of the collateral value of fixed assets measure generates a 
coefficient estimate statistically insignificant, although and with the “right” sign. Chart 1 shows 
the adjustment of the trinomial specification of the collateral value of fixed assets measure to the 
martingale residuals from the auxiliary equation (2) of Table IV. 
  
Chart 1 shows that the scattered residuals form a pattern clearly in accordance with the 
fitted specification for the covariate collateral value of fixed assets reported in main equation (1) 
of Table IV. The continuous line of dots representing the predicted log hazard values is shown 
only for illustrative purposes, since the correct values have been slightly altered. Interpretation 
might go like this: as the small manufacturing enterprises start acquiring fixed assets other than 
machinery, such as vehicles and apparels for accommodating and transporting perishable products, 
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which might be more appropriate as guarantee for loans, the likelihood of exit starts to decrease. 
This goes on up to a certain point in the scale of the variable collateral value of fixed assets. Then 
the hazard of exit starts to increase until a point that coincides with the firms starting to acquire 
real state, such as buildings and land, which are understood to have a higher collateral capacity. 
From this point, the likelihood of exit starts to fall again. 
 
 
Table IV: Determinants of Small Business Survival/The impact of the Collateral Value of Fixed Assets 
Regressors/Independent Variables 
COX PROPORTIONAL HAZARD MODEL 
Main Equation Auxiliary Equations 
(1) (2) (3) 
Net working capital -5.68 (4.33)*** -3.25 (2.82)** -3.67 (2.95)** 
Total Financial Leverage -10.72 (5.18)*** -3.99 (2.67)** -5.03 (2.85)** 
Medium- and Long-term Financial Leverage 11.58 (3.25)** 5.80 (2.21)* 4.01 (1.44) 
Profitability -0.80 (4.04)*** -0.39 (2.53)* -0.46 (2.81)** 
Operational cycle1/3 -27.25 (4.19)*** -12.37 (2.34)* -11.28 (2.12)* 
Operational cycle1/2 9.52 (4.48)*** 4.16 (2.51)* 3.85 (2.32)* 
Automation degree -7.18 (5.36)*** -3.08 (3.20)** -3.20 (3.28)** 
Automation degree2 1.35 (5.56)*** 0.53 (3.38)*** 0.57 (3.54)*** 
Collateral value of fixed assets -75.16 (5.51)*** - - -2.29 (1.79) 
Collateral value of fixed assets2 150.51 (5.18)*** - - - - 
Collateral value of fixed assets3 -86.20 (4.95)*** - - - - 
Corporate diversification -0.04 (3.51)*** -0.02 (2.03)* -0.02 (2.13)* 
Market concentration -0.12 (3.68)*** -0.02 (0.66) -0.03 (0.91) 
Market concentration2 1.24e-3 (3.73)*** 1.89e-4 (0.68) 2.25e-4 (0.82) 
Client concentration 0.06 (4.47)*** 0.02 (2.76)** 0.02 (2.81)** 
Sales concentration in big clients 0.10 (5.54)*** 0.05 (4.28)*** 0.06 (4.17)*** 
Sales unpredictability 0.33 (3.08)** 0.23 (2.43)* 0.23 (2.51)* 
Entrepreneur’s Risk Tolerance 2.06 (5.87)*** 0.83 (4.04)*** 0.88 (4.16)*** 
3-year lagged GDP growth rate  -0.34 (3.16)** -0.35 (3.19)** -0.36 (3.27)** 
1998 year dummy 6.49 (5.21)*** 2.90 (3.51)*** 3.36 (3.94)*** 
Market concentration X Operational cycle -4.53e-4 (3.42)*** -1.38e-4 (1.16) -1.08e-4 (0.87) 
Sales concentration in big clients X Machinery/fixed 
assets ratio -0.11 (4.24)*** -0.04 (2.86)** -0.07 (3.21)** 
R 2 0.84 0.64 0.66 p 
LR chi2(22/19/20) 113.01*** 63.00*** 66.58*** 
Obs: 1) First values in the main body of the table are coefficient estimates; 2) numbers in parentheses are absolute-value z-
statistics; 3) *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 5%, 1%, and 0.1% levels, respectively; 4) Number of 
events/observations (firms): 46/61. 
 
 
 Chart 2 reinforces the above interpretation, since it shows that the covariate collateral value 
of fixed assets is associated with the variable total financial leverage in a way consistent with that 
interpretation. The case for endogeneity might be alleged, that is, that it is the loans, mainly 
medium- and long-term ones, that have allowed the acquiring of the respective fixed assets, and 
not that it is these fixed assets have made it possible to additionally finance the company. Chart 3 
signalizes that this need not be the case, once, as shown by the chart, the association between the 
covariates collateral value of fixed assets and medium- and long-term financial leverage does not 
observe the same pattern as in Chart 2. So, fixed assets with higher collateral capacity help to raise 
financing of all maturities and also the survival prospects for the small manufacturing enterprises. 
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Conclusions can be drawn from the analyses so far. First, that all measures of capital 
intensity adjust to the hazard rate data only in a binomial, U-shaped fashion. The monotonic 
specification is never the best fitting. Second, that the concept of the collateral value of fixed 
assets is crucial to the explanation of the variations in the small manufacturing enterprises’ 
probability of exit. 
 
 The foregoing allows the postulation of a new framework that best represents the 
relationship between the firm’s capital intensity and small business survival, which is proposed for 
investigating, analyzing and interpreting such a relationship, being it either central to the study or 
included only as a control. Such framework is built upon two realizations. The first is that the 
relationship between capital intensity and the small businesses’ hazard of exit is binomial, U-
shaped. A linear fitting is artificial, although, as a rule, produces a negative relationship. The 
second realization is that a quadratic specification may not be always the best fit for the 
relationship. The U-shaped relationship is many times not symmetrical. It is so much so that this is 
the reason why the linear fitting produces, as a rule, a negative relationship. A binomial 
specification with a combination of powers either smaller than the unit or greater than the square 
may fit better the regression. Also, crucial to understanding variations in the hazard of exit is that 
these variations depend so much on the collateral value of the firm’s fixed assets. In this case the 
actual relationship is wave-shaped. 
 
 Such a theoretical framework and its predictions are important in that compliance with 
them in studies that involve the relationship between capital intensity and small business survival 
promises the obtaining of more realistic overall results. The obtaining of better overall results can 
be attributable to 1) a more correct econometric representation of the relationship between capital 
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intensity and the survival of small businesses and also to 2) the fact that such more correct 
specification can greatly increase the quality of the results pertaining to all other studied or 
controlled for effects. 
 
 
 
4. CORROBORATIVE EVIDENCE FROM THE EXTANT LITERATURE 
 
 Amazingly, empirical studies do not report attempts to fit non-linear specifications for 
capital intensity measures. Thus, direct evidence strictly speaking is not found in the empirical 
literature on small business survival. A way found to use the previous empirical studies as a 
source of corroborative evidence is to look at their results, mainly the disparate, awkward, 
embarrassing, unexpected and unacceptable ones, to see whether they are in accordance with the 
predictions of the frame of reference postulated in Section 3. An implication of this is that weird 
results signalize that correction is needed in accordance with the postulated frame of reference. 
 
One prediction of the new postulated framework is that the negative association between 
the capital intensity measures and the hazard of exit is the most common outcome to be obtained 
by studies fitting a monotonic specification. Table V exhibits results from the previous small 
businesses’ empirical literature according to the nature of the findings. The counting is 10 for the 
decreasing relationship, 6 for the increasing and 5 for no relationship. The prediction holds, but it 
might be seen as evidence also in favor of the prevalent conventional frame of reference. So, the 
analysis will proceed to look for extra evidence in all the studies listed in Table V. This task will 
be presented observing the chronological order of the publishing of the reviewed articles. 
 
TABLE V - FINDINGS OF PREVIOUS STUDIES ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CAPITAL 
INTENSITY AND THE SMALL BUSINESSES’ HAZARD OF EXIT 
 
 
NEGATIVE  
RELATIONSHIP POSITIVE RELATIONSHIP NO RELATIONSHIP 
STUDIES 
Doms and Others (1995); Kimura and 
Fujii (2003); Audretsch (2004)§; Taymaz 
(2005); Grossi and Gozzi (2006)*; 
Bernard and Jensen (2007); Ferragina 
and Mazzotta (2015); Fernandes and 
Paunov (2015) (at first and third) and 
Howell (2015). 
Winter (1998); Bławat and Others 
(2001)+; Frazer  (2005); 
Söderbom and Others (2006); 
Taymaz and Ozler (2007) and 
Yang and Temple (2012) (at 
second). 
Kimura and Fujii (2003); 
Shiferaw (2009); Yang and 
Temple (2012) (at first); Ha 
(2013) and Fernandes and 
Paunov (2015) (at second). 
COUNT 10 6 5 
Obs.: 1) + Perceptual assessment of capital intensity; 2) § Capital intensity measured as the percentage of the production costs 
made up by energy and depreciation costs; 3) * Capital intensity measured as asset depreciation cost divided by total assets. 
 
Doms and Others (1995) produce extra evidence, since their Table 2 shows results that are 
contrary to expectation, which are predicted by the new proposed framework when the 
capital/labor ratio is not specified binomially. For example, in their equation (1), they specify the 
capital/labor ratio and labor productivity monotonically and fit them simultaneously. Results are 
that both variables are negatively signed, but labor productivity is not statistically significant. The 
explanation that is immediately prompted is that these variables are troubling one another by 
virtue of the fact that they are calculated by the division of two quantities, normally highly 
correlated with each other, into the same denominator. These quantities are, on the one hand, 
either sales or value added and, on the other hand, fixed assets and the denominator is number of 
employees, which is also highly correlated with the two quantities. All these intercorrelations 
signalize that the capital/labor ratio and labor productivity are bound to be highly correlated with 
each other. However, the proposed new framework predicts that even so the troubling need not be 
the case. Table VI of the present work exhibits results from an experiment with data from the 
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reference study. Its auxiliary equation (3) shows a pattern for the capital/labor ratio and labor 
productivity similar to that in Doms and Others (1995)’s work, being the only difference that in 
these authors’ study the capital/labor ratio is the variable that exerts the stronger influence. More 
specifically, when these covariates enter simultaneously the regression equation, the capital/labor 
ratio is totally statistically insignificant. However, when, from auxiliary equation (3) to (5), a 
quadratic term for the capital/labor ratio is added on, significance comes back for this covariate. In 
fact, in auxiliary equation (5) both labor productivity and the capital/labor ratio, as well as its 
quadratic term, have the “right” signs and are statistically significant. Concluding, adding a 
quadratic term for the capital/labor ratio in equation (1) of Table 2 in Doms and Others (1995)’s 
work might cause similar changes, lending support to the new framework proposed by the present 
study. 
 
 
Table VI: Determinants of Small Business Survival/The Capital/labor Ratio and Labor Productivity 
Regressors/Independent 
Variables 
COX PROPORTIONAL HAZARD MODEL 
Auxiliary Equations 
(1)+ (2)+ (3)+ (4)+ (5)+ 
Capital/labor ratio -0.69e-4 (2.27)* n.a. n.a. 0.12e-4 (0.36) -0.39e-3 (3.22)** -0.29e-3 (2.30)* 
Capital/labor ratio2 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.99e-8 (2.75)** 0.88e-8 (2.45)* 
Labor productivity n.a. n.a. -2.33e-8 (3.65)*** -2.47e-8 (3.31)** n.a. n.a. -2.34e-8 (3.01)** 
R 2 0.68 0.74 0.74 0.72 0.76 p 
LR chi2(18/18/19/19/20) 68.31*** 80.61*** 80.74*** 76.35*** 86.84*** 
Obs: 1) First values in the main body of the table are coefficient estimates; 2) numbers in parentheses are absolute-value z-
statistics; 3) *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 5%, 1%, and 0.1% levels, respectively; 4) + Without case 43, which 
is an influential outlier; 5) Number of events/observations (firms): 46/61; 6) Results for 17 regressors/independent variables are 
omitted; 7) Medium- and Long-term Financial Leverage, Corporate diversification, Market concentration, Market concentration2 and 
Sales unpredictability are missing in relation to the main equation. 
 
  
 
Table VII: Determinants of Small Business Survival/ Capital/labor Ratio, Labor Productivity and Employment 
Regressors/ 
Independent 
Variables 
COX PROPORTIONAL HAZARD MODEL 
Auxiliary Equations 
(1)+ (2)+ (3)+ (4)+ (5)+ (6)+ 
Capital/ 
labor ratio -0.29e-3 (2.30)* -0.28e-3 (2.21)* 0.34e-6 (0.01) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Capital/ 
labor ratio2 0.88e-8 (2.45)* 0.84e-8 (2.28)* n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Labor 
productivity -2.34e-8 (3.01)** -2.39e-8 (3.06)** -2.53e-8 (3.34)** -2.53e-8 (3.80)*** n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
employment n.a. n.a. -0.01 (0.26) -0.01 (0.26) -0.01 (0.26) 0.02 (0.84) 3.39e-3 (0.66) 
employment2 n.a. n.a. 1.50e-5 (0.10) -2.86e-6 (0.02) -2.86e-6 (0.02) -9.23e-5 (0.69) n.a. n.a. 
R 2 0.76 0.77 0.74 0.74 0.65 0.65 p 
LRchi2(20/22/
21/20/19/18) 86.84*** 87.19*** 81.78*** 81.78*** 63.09*** 62.61*** 
Obs: 1) First values in the main body of the table are coefficient estimates; 2) numbers in parentheses are absolute-value z-
statistics; 3) *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 5%, 1%, and 0.1% levels, respectively; 4) + Without case 43, which 
is an influential outlier; 5) Number of events/observations (firms): 46/61; 6) Results for 17 regressors/independent variables are 
omitted; 7) Medium- and Long-term Financial Leverage, Corporate diversification, Market concentration, Market concentration2 and 
Sales unpredictability are missing in relation to the main equation. 
  
 
As important as the search for evidence supporting the proposed new framework is to 
consider possible arguments that might militate against it. For example, it might be alleged that 
the quadratic term in auxiliary equation (5) is capturing the effect of the quadratic term of size. 
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Barbosa (2016b) and many articles reviewed by him show that size is related to the hazard of exit 
in either an inverted U-shaped or a U-shaped manner. Equations (3) and (4) in Doms and Others 
(1995)’s Table 2 document that the introduction of employment into the regression analysis 
reduces the coefficients and statistical significance of the capital/labor ratio, labor productivity and 
total factor productivity, among other variables. Table VII of the present study shows results when 
employment and squared employment in various specifications enter the Cox regression analysis 
reported in Table VI. Results confirm that the above possible allegation makes no sense, since 
neither employment nor squared employment is significant in any specification. Specifying ln of 
employment does not bring about better results. Coming ahead in the text, there is another 
revision, carried out against results reported in Table IX and involving size measured as total 
assets, which produces additional evidence of the same kind, only that size is highly statistically 
significant. Concluding, discarding possible counter-supportive allegations also lends support to 
the appropriateness of the new framework proposed in this working paper. 
 
Winter (1998) reports a table of probit estimates in which firm productivity and the 
capital/labor ratio enter the same equation. Firm productivity has the expected, negative sign, 
although against expectation lacks statistical significance. The capital/labor ratio is highly 
statistically significant, but the sign is, against expectation, positive. The fact that the capital/labor 
ratio is positively signed is a prediction of the new proposed framework, already discussed and 
confirmed by other 5 cases listed in Table V, and may happen if the actual U-shaped relationship 
is asymmetric. The uptrend would be either more numerous in terms of residuals, or more clearly 
defined as a tendency, with the residuals clustered more closely around a virtual fitting curve, or 
more inclined, or even all together. The adding of a quadratic term for the capital/labor ratio in 
Winter (1998)’ specification most probably will turn the above two counter-intuitive results into 
results more consistent with expectations as argumented and demonstrated with respect to the 
findings by Doms and Others (1995). Concluding, Winter (1998)’s results may also be seen as 
providing extra evidence in support to the new proposed framework. 
 
Audretsch and Others (2004) present extra evidence in favor of the proposed new 
framework because they work also with capital intensity measured at the industry level. This 
variable is at final marginally statistically significant in a positive association with the hazard of 
exit. The authors interpret this as being consistent with the idea that, as capital intensity is usually 
seen as a measure of economies of scale, their finding suggests that new-firm survival rates are 
lower in industries with substantial economies of scale and hence greater cost disadvantages for 
small firms. However, it is contended here that, although there is no denial that the industry capital 
intensity is an actual determinant of the small business failure rate, in fact that finding means that 
the variable capital intensity measured at the level of the industry is to a high extent capturing the 
upward trend of the actual U-shaped relationship between capital intensity measured at the firm 
level with the hazard of exit, whereas the variable capital intensity measured at the level of the 
enterprise is capturing the downward trend. This behavior by the industry capital intensity variable 
fulfills a prediction of the proposed new framework that the fitting of a variable that correlates 
with the firm’s capital intensity will capture the upward trend of the actual U-shaped relationship 
between the capital intensity measured at the firm level with the hazard of exit in the case that a 
quadratic term, in addition to the linear one, for the firm’s capital intensity is not specified. 
 
Table VIII exhibits results from an experiment with data from the reference study that 
show that the above may really be the case for the study under review, although there are 
differences in the way capital intensity is measured. The variable plant & equipment measured at 
the level of the industry was calculated in the same way as in the Audretsch and Others (2004)’s 
work, that is, as the mean for the enterprise level data for each studied manufacturing sector.  
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Table VIII: Determinants of Small Business Survival/ Plant & Equipment Ratio 
Regressors/Independent 
Variables 
COX PROPORTIONAL HAZARD MODEL 
Auxiliary Equations 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Industry level plant & equipment ratio 13.76 (2.86)** n.a. n.a. 13.61 (2.72)** 11.41 (2.42) n.a. n.a. 
(Firm level plant & equipment ratio)(1) (1) (1) (na) (1) -3.42 (1.81) -10.39 (2.41)* -10.79 (2.50)* n.a. n.a. -2.00 (1.06) 
(Firm level plant & equipment ratio)(na) (2) (2) (na) (na) n.a. n.a. 10.30 (2.16)* 9.34 (1.91) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
R 2 0.68 0.66 0.70 0.66 0.63 p 
LR chi2(21/21/22/20/20) 68.95*** 65.31*** 72.62*** 65.57*** 60.77*** 
Obs: 1) First values in the main body of the table are coefficient estimates; 2) numbers in parentheses are absolute value z-
statistics; 3) *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 5%, 1%, and 0.1% levels, respectively; 4) Number of 
events/observations (firms): 46/61; 5) Results for 19 regressors/independent variables are omitted. 
 
Auxiliary equation (1) shows a specification equivalent to that in Audretsch and Others 
(2004)’s work, although results differ in some respects. It is clearly visible that the industry level 
plant & equipment has the highest coefficient and statistical significance as compared to the other 
equations in Table VIII in which it is specified. So, as in auxiliary equation (1) the quadratic term 
for the firm level plant & equipment is not specified, the allegation made above that the industry 
level plant & and equipment captures much of its effect may be true. On the other hand, the 
quadratic term for the firm level plant & equipment has a higher coefficient and statistical 
significance in auxiliary equation (2), in which the industry level plant & equipment is missing. 
This might be seen as evidence unfavorable to the new proposed framework because it would be 
consistent with a possible allegation that the findings in the reference study of a U-shaped 
relationship might be attributable to the quadratic term capturing the effects of other factors, as, 
for example, the industry level capital intensity. Auxiliary equation (3) demonstrates that this need 
not be the case, since all three entries are at least marginally statistically significant at the 10% 
level. So, all the foregoing is seen as lending extra strong support to the new proposed framework. 
 
Frazer (2005) reported many tables of probit estimates in which firm productivity, the 
capital/labor ratio and firm employment enter the same equation. As predicted by the new 
proposed framework, these variables seem to be troubling one another. Firm productivity and firm 
employment are always highly statistically significant and, as expected, negatively signed. The 
capital/labor ratio is statistically significant, but the sign is, against expectation, positive. Frazer 
(2005) interprets the unexpected result as supporting the trade theory prediction that capital 
intensive firms go out of business when exposed to international competition. However, this 
counter-intuitive result may be an outcome of failure to add a quadratic term for the capital/labor 
ratio, as argumented and demonstrated above with respect to the findings by Doms and Others 
(1995) and by Winter (1998). The fact that the capital/labor ratio is positively signed is a 
prediction of the new proposed framework, already discussed and confirmed by other five cases in 
Table V. This may happen if the actual U-shaped relationship is asymmetric, as explained in the 
revision of Winter (1998)’s article. Put in other words, the counter-intuitive result for the 
capital/labor ratio would be the result of a misguided attempt to fit an “artificial” monotonic, 
linear specification to an actual asymmetric U-shaped relationship with the firms’ probability of 
exit. Concluding, Frazer (2005)’s results may also be seen as providing extra evidence in support 
to the new proposed framework. 
 
Because Frazer (2005) makes use of total factor productivity and the previous experiments 
in the present paper make use of labor productivity, Table IX shows results when the former 
measure of firm productivity is specified. Also, ln of total assets replaces employment as the 
measure of size. Auxiliary equation (1) shows that the three factors need not trouble one another.  
All have the expected signs and are highly statistically significant. Auxiliary equation (2) 
demonstrates that the misguided monotonic specification of the capital/labor ratio produces a 
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statistically insignificant coefficient for this covariate and reduces the coefficients and significance 
level of the other covariates. Auxiliary equation (3) shows that similar results are obtained if it is 
ln of total assets that is “wrongly” monotonically specified. Conclusions are the same from 
inspection of auxiliary equations (4) and (5). The only exception is auxiliary equation (4), in 
which total factor productivity takes advantage of the total absence of the capital/labor ratio to 
raise its coefficient and significance level. However, all in all, results in Table IX refute possible 
allegations that the quadratic term of the capital/labor ratio captures the effects of the quadratic 
term of size and that the variables trouble each other because their measures are built upon the 
same or highly correlated factors, such as employment. 
 
 
Table IX: Determinants of Small Business Survival/ Capital/labor Ratio, Total Factor Productivity and Ln of 
Total Assets 
Regressors/Independent 
Variables 
COX PROPORTIONAL HAZARD MODEL 
Auxiliary Equations 
(1)+ (2)+ (3)+ (4)+ (5)+ 
Capital/labor ratio -0.42e-3 (2.85)** -0.31e-4 (1.05) -0.28e-3 (2.15)* n.a. n.a. -0.36e-3 (2.81)** 
Capital/labor ratio2 0.11e-7 (2.74)** n.a. n.a. 0.74e-8 (2.00)* n.a. n.a. 0.97e-8 (2.62)** 
Ln total assets -3.18 (3.81)*** -2.79 (3.42)*** -0.43 (1.70) -2.70 (3.44)*** n.a. n.a. 
(Ln total assets)2 0.26 (3.40)*** 0.21 (2.85)** n.a. n.a. 0.20 (2.85)** n.a. n.a. 
Total factor productivity -5.73 (4.14)*** -5.59 (4.12)*** -3.30 (2.91)** -5.94 (4.58)*** -3.25 (2.65)** 
R 2 0.81 0.78 0.76 0.78 0.75 p 
LRchi2(22/21/21/20/20/23) 98.81*** 90.79*** 86.27*** 89.60*** 83.66*** 
Obs: 1) First values in the main body of the table are coefficient estimates; 2) numbers in parentheses are absolute-value z-
statistics; 3) *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 5%, 1%, and 0.1% levels, respectively; 4) + Without case 43, which 
is an influential outlier; 5) Number of events/observations (firms): 46/61; 6) Results for 17 regressors/independent variables are 
omitted; 7) Medium- and Long-term Financial Leverage, Corporate diversification, Market concentration, Market concentration2 and 
Sales unpredictability are missing in relation to the main equation. 
  
The interpretation by Frazer (2005) that the unexpected result supports the trade theory 
prediction that capital-intensive firms go out of business when exposed to international 
competition may nevertheless be conciliated with that by this article that it is due to failure to 
specify a quadratic term for the capital/labor ratio. The U-shaped relationship between capital 
intensity and the hazard of exit is explained for the case of small manufacturing enterprises in 
developing nations by excessive modernization in technological terms that destroys their intrinsic, 
internal self-beneficial characteristics without releasing them from their intrinsic, internal self-
inimical characteristics, as explained with recourse to the “theories of domination” in the 
introduction section of this work. International competition only plays the part of revealing this 
reality that is covered up by customs protective policies, once these are withdrawn. 
 
Yang and Temple (2012) for sure add extra evidence, since they fit in their second table of 
Cox regressions an interaction of capital intensity and a dummy variable representing years before 
and after reforms carried out in China, besides the monotonic specification for capital intensity 
that in their first table resulted in a statistically insignificant coefficient. In this second table both 
covariates are highly statistically significant and have opposite signs. All this is consistent with the 
predictions of the proposed new framework for an actual perfectly symmetric or almost perfectly 
symmetric U-shaped relationship between capital intensity and the hazard of exit in small 
enterprises in developing countries. First, lack of statistical significance in the first table of Cox 
regressions, where capital intensity is specified monotonically and interactions are not fitted, is the 
result predicted by the proposed new frame of reference and to be expected from a misguided 
attempt to fit a linear specification when the real relationship is a perfectly symmetric or almost 
perfectly symmetric U-shaped one. Second, in the second table of Cox regressions, the linear term 
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is capturing the uptrend of the actual U-shaped relationship and the interaction its downtrend. The 
corresponding prediction of the new proposed framework is that, in the absence of an additional 
quadratic specification for the capital intensity variable, any other covariate with some degree of 
correlation with capital intensity may capture one of the trends of the actual U-shaped relationship 
and the linear capital intensity specification the other. For sure, the Yang and Temple (2012)’s 
interaction has some capital intensity content and, as a consequence, is correlated with it. 
 
 Table X demonstrates that the relationships found by Yang and Temple (2012) are easily 
replicated with data from the reference study. Auxiliary equation (1) shows that type of firm is not 
related to the hazard of exit, once its estimated coefficient is totally statistically insignificant. 
Auxiliary equation (2) shows a predicted result for the misguided fitting of a monotonic 
specification of the capital/labor ratio. Auxiliary equation (3) shows results that confirm that the 
relationship between the capital/labor ratio and the hazard of exit is U-shaped. Auxiliary equation 
(4) shows results very similar to the ones obtained by Yang and Temple (2012) when the quadratic 
term of the correct specification for the capital/labor ratio is replaced by an interaction between the 
capital/labor ratio and some short-scaled covariate of the reference study data equivalent to the 
one used in Yang and Temple (2012)’s work. Finally, auxiliary equation (5) shows that either the 
specification in (3) or in (4) exhausts the capturing of the effect of the capital/labor ratio, once 
only two covariates are statistically significant. Further scrutiny, not reported, reveals that the 
interaction has a better performance than the capital/labor ratio, linearly specified, because its 
correlation coefficient with the quadratic term is a little lower than that between the quadratic term 
and the linear term of the capital/labor specification. 
 
Table X: Determinants of Small Business Survival/ Capital/labor Ratio and Type of Firm 
Regressors/ 
Independent 
Variables 
COX PROPORTIONAL HAZARD MODEL PEARSON 
CORRELATION Auxiliary equations 
 
 
 
(1)+ 
From 
Table I  
Equation 2 
 (2)+ 
From 
Table I 
 Equation 3 
(3)+ 
 
 
 
(4)+ 
 
 
 
(5)+ 
Capital/ 
labor 
ratio 
Type 
of 
firm 
Capital/labor ratio X 
Type of firm n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. -0.20e-3 (3.30)** -0.16e-3 (2.55)* 0.95*** 0.13 
Capital/labor 
ratio(na)(1)(1)(1)(1) n.a. n.a. -0.50e-4 (1.36) -0.59e-3 (3.37)*** 0.24e-3 (2.61)** -0.29e-3 (1.30) 
 Capital/labor ratio
(na)(na) 
(2)(na)(2) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.16e-7 (3.25)** n.a. n.a. 0.14e-7 (2.54)* 
Type of firm -0.28 (0.58) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
R 2 0.84 0.85 0.87 0.87 0.89 
 p LR 
chi2(23/23/24/24/25) 111.59*** 113.26*** 124.60*** 124.55*** 131.20*** 
Obs: 1) First values in the main body of the table are coefficient estimates; 2) numbers in parentheses are absolute value z-
statistics; 3) *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 5%, 1%, and 0.1% levels, respectively; 4) + Without case 43, which 
is an influential outlier; 5)Number of events/observations (firms): 46/61; 6) Results for 22 regressors/independent variables are 
omitted; 7) There are no regressors/independent variables missing in relation to the main equation. 
 
Yang and Temple (2012) affirm that a significant negative effect of high capital intensity 
exists only after 1992, a result of economic reforms. This is an ad hoc explanation. The 
explanation advanced in the present study is general. According to the new proposed framework, 
there are two reasons why the capital intensity covariate proxies for the quadratic term of the 
correct specification, once it is positively signed, and the interaction for the linear term, and not 
the other way round, as might be expected. A reason is that in the work under review the actual U-
shaped relationship is in fact a little asymmetric, as in the first table of Cox regressions all 
coefficients for capital intensity are positive and, out of eight, one reaches statistical significance 
at the 10% level.  Then, the uptrend is either more numerous in terms of residuals, or more clearly 
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defined as a tendency, with the residuals clustered more closely around a virtual fitting curve, or 
more inclined, or even all together. A second, and complementary reason, is that the linear term in 
the second table of Cox regressions has more valid values, that is, different from zero, for the 
covariate capital intensity, since in the interaction term the multiplying by the dummy variable, 
composed of 0 and 1 values, makes many valid values for capital intensity become 0 values, 
meaning no variation for a great part of the independent variable. 
 
Although there is no denying that economic reforms may have an impact on the 
relationship between capital intensity and the hazard of exit, as a type of them was discussed with 
respect to the work by Frazer (2005), the exercise carried out by Yang and Temple (2012) needs to 
be confronted with some aspects of the survival analysis techniques that might have unduly 
influenced their results. The monotonic specification for the economic reforms dummy was not 
kept by Yang and Temple (2012) in their second table where the interactions were fitted. Hosmer 
and Lemeshow (1999 p.164-5) teach that when there are statistically significant interactions, the 
corresponding main effect terms should be included in the model, regardless of their statistical 
significance. Although Yang and Temple (2012) declare their noble intention of estimating 
directly whether the acceleration of economic reform since 1992 had had any impact upon the 
firms’ exit behaviors by specifying interactions of the economic reforms dummy and all their 
firm-level variables, keeping the dummy along with the interactions would have purged from the 
results the effects of variables not controlled for by the regressions. In the Yang and Temple 
(2012)’s first table the dummy is highly statistically significant in all equations and it is positively 
signed, meaning that the reforms raised the hazard of exit. This is very possible because Barbosa 
(2016c) showed that high economic growth produces higher mortality of incumbent small 
enterprises as a result of higher competition by new firms set up by opportunity entrepreneurs. 
And publicly available information confirms that the years after 1992 brought back very high 
GDP growth rates in China. Although the GDP growth rate is fitted in both tables and is 
statistically significant and positively signed, still much of the estimated positive impact of the 
interaction between the dummy with capital intensity might be in Yang and Temple (2012)’s work 
capturing the GDP growth rate effect, and this should be purged. Last, and perhaps most 
important, time is split into two parts by the reform dummy variable, which may consequently 
positively correlate with the follow-up years. Year can not by itself enter the Cox regression 
equations because it is collinear with the baseline hazard function. But, the dummy variable and 
also the interaction can, since they are not in econometric terms the same thing as year. However, 
as they carry, even if partially, the same content, it may be time, which is negatively correlated 
with the baseline hazard function, that is producing the negative impact of the interaction between 
the dummy and capital intensity. Coming ahead in the text, there is another revision, carried out 
against results reported in Table XI, which produces evidence of the same kind. 
 
Fernandes and Paunov (2015) report in their Tables 3, of initial results, and 4, of main 
results, that capital intensity initially relates with the hazard of exit in a negative and statistically 
significant manner. However, as labor productivity is added on, capital intensity loses all its 
statistical significance. This partial analysis is enough as evidence in favor of the proposed new 
framework, since, as demonstrated in the revising of Doms and Others (1995)’s results, through 
the presentation in Table VI, the losing of statistical significance is due to failure of specifying an 
additional quadratic term for the capital/labor covariate. Fernandes and Paunov (2015) add then, as 
next step, an interaction between capital intensity and age, instead. Results from this action bring 
back the same analysis carried on in the revising of Yang and Temple (2012)’s article. Final 
results reported in auxiliary equation (4) of Table XI differ a little from those for auxiliary 
equation (5) of Table X because year, differently from type of firm, is linearly correlated with the 
hazard of exit. As a consequence, all three covariates in Table XI are predicted to and show 
statistically significant relationships with the hazard of exit. The interaction, in the absence of the 
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quadratic term for capital intensity, is capturing the uptrend of the actual U-shaped relationship 
between capital intensity and the hazard of exit. Fernandes and Paunov (2015) lend then a twofold 
support for the new proposed framework. 
 
TABLE XI – CAPITAL/LABOR RATIO AND SMALL BUSINESS AND HAZARD OF EXIT 
Regressors/Independent 
Variables 
COX PROPORTIONAL HAZARD MODEL PEARSON 
CORRELATION Auxiliary equations 
From 
Table I Equation 4 
(1)+ 
 
 
(2)+ 
 
 
(3)+ 
 
 
(4)+ 
Capital/labor 
ratio Year 
Capital/labor ratio X Year n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. -0.36e-4 (4.33)*** -0.23e-4 (3.12)** 0.71*** 0.48*** 
Capital/labor ratio(1)(1)(1)(1) -0.65e-3 (4.11)*** -0.11e-4 (0.33) 0.14e-3 (3.24)** -0.38e-3 (2.16)* 
 
Capital/labor ratio(2)(na)(na)(2) 0.19e-7 (4.19)*** n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.15e-7 (3.02)** 
R 2 0.84 0.77 0.85 0.87 
 p 
LR chi2(21/20/21/22) 109.42*** 89.17*** 112.99*** 121.26*** 
Obs: 1) First values in the main body of the table are coefficient estimates; 2) numbers in parentheses are absolute value z-
statistics; 3) *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 5%, 1%, and 0.1% levels, respectively; 4) + Without case 43, which 
is an influential outlier; 5) Number of events/observations (firms): 46/61; 6) Results for 19 regressors/independent variables are 
omitted; 7) Medium- and Long-term Financial Leverage, Market concentration and Market concentration2 are missing in relation to 
the main equation.  
 
Confronting the analyses carried out by Fernandes and Paunov (2015) with some aspects 
of the survival analysis techniques that might have unduly influenced their results may further 
produce evidence that the effect that their interaction is capturing is in fact the upward trend of the 
U-shaped relationship between capital intensity and the hazard of exit. Fernandes and Paunov 
(2015) inform that their interactions are specified with a view to correcting for the violation of the 
proportional hazard assumption. However, there is no information in the text about the use of the 
special way the interaction for correcting for the violation of the proportional hazard assumption 
should enter the Cox regression equation. According to Hosmer and Lemeshow (1999 p.207), the 
interaction term is not simply the product of the covariate and the subject’s observed value of 
time. If Fernandes and Paunov (2015)’s age interactions are dealt with as if they were simple ones, 
then the impact of the age interaction with capital intensity might be in fact capturing one of the 
trends of the actual U-shaped relationship of capital intensity with the hazard of exit, instead of the 
capturing of the changing over time in the strength of the impact of capital intensity upon the 
hazard of exit. 
 
 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS, STRENGHTS AND LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY AND 
SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH AND SMALL BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT 
SUPPORT POLICIES 
 
The present study has successfully demonstrated that its posited framework of reference 
for research dealing with the relationship between firm capital intensity and small business 
survival is highly invaluable in face of strong support lent by two sources. First, by an in-depth 
piece of research that has investigated a very wide range of postulated determinants of small 
business survival. The overall conclusion from this first source is that the binomial specification of 
capital intensity is the “right” one and that the finding of a statistically significant inverse 
relationship is one of the three possible outcomes to result from a misguided attempt to fit a 
monotonic specification to the actual U-shaped relationship between capital intensity and the 
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small manufacturing enterprises’ hazard of exit. Second, by the power of the postulated 
framework of reference to explain a set of unexpected, embarrassing and unacceptable findings in 
the extant literature on small business survival. The general conclusion from this second source is 
that these weird findings are the result of a specification error and drive authors to misleadly 
attribute the effect of the quadratic term of the real U-shaped relationship between capital intensity 
and the exit risk to other factors.  
 
The specific achievements of the present study are surprisingly numberless and diversified. 
First statistical significance is generally very high. Capital intensity and the collateral value of 
fixed assets are confirmed as major determinants of the small manufacturing enterprises’ hazard of 
exit. This is robust across different ways of measuring capital intensity, including a perceptual 
one. Only that the relationships are U-shaped, with respect to capital intensity, and wave-shaped, 
concerning the collateral value of fixed assets, being these pieces of finding by far the greatest 
breakthroughs brought about by the study. Another striking finding concerning the collateral value 
of fixed assets is that controlling for it amazingly increases the quality of results pertaining to 
practically all the other individual effects. This is also true for automation degree, which is the 
perceptual measure of capital intensity. The robust findings allowed the postulation of a new 
framework that best represents the relationship between capital intensity and small business 
survival, which is proposed for investigating, analyzing and interpreting such a relationship, being 
it either central to the study or included only as a control. Also, many predictions from the 
findings or from interpretations of the findings were also developed. Finally, this framework and 
its predictions were used to confront results in the extant literature in search for extra support for 
the findings and the theses of the present study. This effort was successful in view of the fact that 
the greatest portion of the literature adjusted itself to the new proposed framework. 
 
Some very specific results from this revision of the empirical literature are worth 
mentioning. The troubling among variables, such as capital intensity, firm productivity and size, 
that seems to be due to their sharing of a same base from which to be calculated, as, for instance, 
number of employees, is in fact due to the failure to include a quadratic term for capital intensity. 
Once this term is included in the analyses the troubling disappears. Interactions with capital 
intensity are always suspect of capturing one of the trends of the actual U-shaped relationship 
between capital intensity and the small manufacturing enterprises’ hazard of exit when a quadratic 
term is not specified. Related industry level variables are also suspect to play this same role when 
the same misspecification error occurs. Specific experiments revealed also that it is not the case 
that it is the quadratic specification instead that is taking as its own effects pertaining to other 
factors. 
 
Of course, it has to be acknowledged that the main limitation of this work is that it is partly 
based upon a piece of research that dealt with a small sample. This, in fact, has been duly done to 
the extent that recourse was taken to the extant related literature to search for external support to 
its findings and postulations. In general, other research efforts are characterized by the use of 
samples of huge sizes. On the other hand, it has strengths, represented by the use of a large 
number of covariates defined at the enterprise level, non-linear specifications and combinations of 
exponents for the binomial specifications other than the quadratic combination. However, the 
greatest strength of the research is that its methodology resulted in numerous important findings. 
 
 So, it is imperative to state that empirical research interested in understanding the same or 
phenomena related to the ones investigated in this study should pursue more vigorously the use of 
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an ampler array of covariates, mainly the ones defined at the level of the enterprise, the fitting of 
non-linear specifications, and, although less in this revision, the choice of binomial power 
combinations other than the quadratic one. Other suggestions for future research in the area have 
to do with the predictions made and tested in this study. Thus, one is that researchers should take 
care concerning use of interactions. They are new variables, but as they carry to different extents 
contents of the original variables, it is very possible that they still capture mostly the impact of 
only one of the original ones. One way of having a hint about this is to calculate the correlation 
coefficients of the interaction with the original variables. 
 
 Some suggestions for future research come from the revision work mainly because of 
technical difficulties faced in carrying out such a task. A first suggestion is that all studies dealing 
with either new small firms or incumbent ones, or even a mix of them, should present separate 
results for micro-, small-, medium- and large-sized enterprises. It is becoming clear that each of 
these categories of size have its own set of survivorship determinants, which in turn have 
individually a particular way of working, there existing cases that the determinants behave 
differently depending on which category of size is under consideration. Treating all categories of 
size alike hinders the development of meaningful theories of small business survivorship. A 
second suggestion is that authors should report more fully summary statistics and correlations 
between the variables of their studies. This eases understanding and evaluation of their results. 
The value of this orientation is highlighted when it is recalled that science is an endless process of 
accumulation of knowledge carried out bit by bit through the contribution of new researchers that 
add on the achievements of previous ones. 
 
 As to theory building, results from this piece of research support the “theories of 
domination”, which is directly applicable to the case of small manufacturing enterprises in 
developing countries. Once some revised pieces of research are not really concerned with small 
manufacturing enterprises, it remains unsettled to which extent they are also applicable to the 
small manufacturing enterprises in developed countries and also to the big businesses, which are 
the object of study of the theories of industrial evolution. 
 
One advice for small firms is that they have to be very careful when evaluating market 
opportunities that imply making use of new, modern technology, which the enterprise still has to 
acquire and learn about its operation. Technological modernization of small enterprises in 
developing countries entails dangers, mainly if it is imposed. It can be excessive in such a way 
that the assisted small enterprise can end up suffering from the shortcomings of bigness, without 
getting rid of those of smallness. An example of this would be incurring the risk embodied in 
modern technology, namely, high operational leverage, simultaneously with that arising from 
markets that are unstable, unpredictable and averse to product standardization, namely, high sales 
volatility.  
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APPENDICES: 
 
 
 
 
Appendix I Survival Variables Summary Statistics 
Variables Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Collateral value of fixed assets(28) 0.42 0.30 0.00 1.00 
Capital/labor ratio(Cr$)(29) 7,776.44 8,198.30 0.00 32,930.94 
 Plant & equipment ratio(30) 0.33 0.21 0.01 0.88 
Labor productivity(Cr$)(31) 75,029.70 53,906.47 5,497.03 241,783.17 
Total factor productivity(32) 0.00 0.29 -1.18 0.76 
Type of firm(33) 1.98 0.59 1.00 3.00 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variables 
Fractiles 
Kurtosis* Skewness 0.10 0.50 0.90 
Collateral value of fixed assets(28) 0.09 0.40 0.88 -1.07 0.38 
Capital/labor ratio(29)+ 320.26 4,753.56 21,450.96 2.10 1.68 
 Plant & equipment ratio(30) 0.09 0.29 0.61 0.13 0.79 
Labor productivity(31) 18,549.66 62,880.38 161,485.67 -1.88 1.20 
Total factor productivity(32) -0.36 0.02 0.33 3.11 -0.90 
Type of firm(33) 1.00 2.00 3.00 -0.10 0.00 
Obs.: 1) Number of events/observations (firms): 46/61; 2) + Without case 43, which is an influential outlier; 3) Values in currency 
are in thousands and in 1992 prices, and the mean and year-end exchange rates for that year were Cr$4,516.74 and 
Cr$11,213.12 per US$ Dollar, respectively; 4) *According to Norušis (1992, p.167), in the SPSS the value of kurtosis for the normal 
distribution is, differently from many textbooks in statistics, 0 and not 3. 
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Appendix II Survival Variables Intercorrelation Matrix 
 
Collateral 
value of fixed 
assets (28) 
 
Capital/ 
labor ratio 
(29) + 
Plant & 
equipment 
ratio 
(30) 
 
Labor 
productivity 
(31) 
 
Total factor 
productivity 
(32) 
 
Type of 
firm 
(33) 
Duration(1) 0.08 0.01 -0.14 0.18 0.24 -0.04 
Exit(2) 0.00 -0.01 0.08 -0.16 -0.16 0.11 
Net working capital(3) 0.05 0.02 -0.22 0.02 0.03 0.09 
Total financial leverage(4) -0.09 -0.15 -0.46 0.24 0.52 -0.14 
Medium- and long-term financial leverage(5) -0.16 0.32 0.09 0.14 -0.03 0.08 
Profitability(6) -0.11 -0.08 -0.11 0.00 0.14 -0.19 
Operational cycle(7) 0.07 0.09 -0.05 0.05 -0.11 0.25 
Collateral value of fixed assets(28) - -0.18 -0.15 0.19 -0.02 -0.12 
Automation degree(9) -0.01 -0.18 -0.26 0.00 0.24 -0.05 
Corporate diversification(10) -0.13 0.45 0.12 0.30 0.21 0.06 
Market concentration(11) 0.13 -0.14 0.20 -0.21 -0.28 0.13 
Client concentration(12) 0.01 -0.02 -0.09 -0.02 -0.00 -0.11 
Sales concentration in big clients(13) 0.06 -0.12 -0.24 0.14 0.10 0.05 
Sales unpredictability(14) 0.01 0.05 0.11 -0.31 -0.36 -0.29 
Entrepreneur’s risk tolerance(15) -0.18 0.08 -0.00 0.02 0.06 0.01 
3-year-lagged GDP growth rate(23) 0.25 -0.15 -0.15 0.06 0.06 -0.20 
1998 year dummy(26) 0.20 -0.12 -0.19 0.15 0.26 -0.08 
Capital/labor ratio(29)+ -0.12 - 0.34 0.42 0.13 -0.06 
 Plant & equipment ratio(30) -0.15 0.40 - -0.26 -0.49 0.11 
Labor productivity(31) 0.19 0.24 -0.26 - 0.72 0.00 
Total factor productivity(32) -0.02 0.04 -0.49 0.72 - -0.15 
Type of firm(33) -0.12 -0.08 0.11 0.00 -0.15 - 
Obs.:1) Number of events/observations (firms): 46/61; 2) + Without case 43, which is an influential outlier;  3) Coefficients in 
absolute values higher than 0.20 are statistically significant at the 5% level, higher than 0.30 at the 1%, and higher than 0.40 at the 
0.1%, in one-tail test. 
